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ABSTRACT 
In this study we examine the common practice of employee performance rating 
calibration, the process in which calibration committee members discuss, 
compare, and potentially adjust supervisors’ preliminary subjective employee 
performance ratings. We highlight the inherent incentive conflict related to 
calibration between the organization and supervisors, where the organization 
wants calibration to increase consistency in performance ratings while supervisors 
are also interested in adjustments that benefit themselves. We show that in peer-
level calibration, where supervisors are involved in the calibration of their own 
employees’ ratings, supervisors strategically use this opportunity to influence the 
calibration process. Specifically, we show that incentive-driven supervisor rating 
behavior predicts the winners and losers of the peer-level calibration process. The 
adjustments (or lack thereof) made during the calibration process are not solely 
driven by the organizational objective of increased rating consistency, but also by 
supervisors’ incentives. Our research has important implications for the designers 
of performance evaluation and compensation plans. It highlights the importance 
of the structural design and the composition of calibration committees, and 
cautions against overestimating the accuracy of post-calibration performance 
ratings when using them for important decisions such as promotions and resource 
allocation.  
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1. Introduction 
Performance rating calibration, the process where calibration committee members 
discuss, compare, and potentially adjust supervisors’ preliminary subjective employee 
performance ratings, has become part of the employee performance evaluation process in many 
organizations (Lawler, Benson, and McDermott [2012], Hastings [2011]). Mercer’s Global 
Performance Management Survey [2013] shows that of the 1,000 organizations surveyed, more 
than half (56 percent) use calibration. In this study we examine how supervisor incentives 
influence the outcomes of the calibration process; i.e., post-calibration employee performance 
ratings. We investigate the inherent incentive conflict concerning calibration that exists between 
supervisors and the organization. Organizations want calibration committees to make 
adjustments that increase consistency in performance ratings (Fox [2009], Sammer [2008]); 
supervisors, on the other hand, are also interested in adjustments that benefit themselves (Traub 
[2013]). Understanding that supervisors’ incentives in calibration committees are at odds with 
the organizational objectives and the impact that this has on supervisors’ rating choices is 
important because it triggers organizations to assess and potentially change the use and/or 
structural design of calibration committees. This can lead to better performance evaluation and 
compensation processes, which significantly impact organizational success (Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy [1994], Lawler et al. [2012], Kampköter and Sliwka [2015]). 
Calibration committees can be structured in different ways. In this study we focus on peer-
level calibration committees, where peer supervisors meet to calibrate the subjective employee 
performance ratings of all the supervisors in the calibration committee, including their own 
(Lawler et al. [2012], Hastings [2011]). Other examples of calibration committee types are 
higher-level calibration committees, where higher-level managers (e.g., segment heads) calibrate 
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the lower-level supervisors’ employee performance ratings (Demeré, Sedatole, and Woods 
[2018]), and mixed-level calibration committees, where both peer supervisors and higher-level 
managers are part of the calibration committee (Grabner, Künneke, and Moers [2018]). The fact 
that members of the calibration committee are calibrating their own evaluations of their 
employees and the evaluations of their direct peers is an important structural design feature of 
the peer-level calibration process. It provides supervisors with the opportunity to strategically 
influence the calibration process, which is critical because of the aforementioned incentive 
conflict. Supervisors have incentives to base their employee performance ratings not purely on 
employee performance, but to also consider their own personal costs and benefits related to 
employee performance ratings (Bol [2011]). Specifically, supervisors tend to prefer relatively 
higher performance ratings (i.e., ratings a little higher than the employees’ ‘true’ performance 
ratings), especially for the weaker employees, because higher ratings will likely lead to fewer 
confrontations (Napier and Latham [1986]), greater employee appreciation (Spence and Keeping 
[2011]), and increased employee motivation (Bol [2011]).  
Organizations, on the other hand, want ratings that clearly distinguish among bottom, 
average, and top performers (Kampkötter and Sliwka [2015], Murphy [1992], Bretz Jr., 
Milkovich, and Read [1992]). They do not want different performance levels to receive the same 
performance ratings nor do they want similar performance levels to receive different 
performance ratings. Both situations would increase perceived unfairness, which is detrimental 
to employee motivation (Colquitt and Chertkoff [2002], Erdogan [2002]). Rating inconsistencies 
also negatively influence personnel decisions like promotions and task assignments (Moers 
[2005]). Thus, organizations want consistency in performance ratings by increasing the 
consistency of the application of rating criteria and by decreasing rater inaccuracies (Caruso 
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[2013]). Organizations frequently push down this organizational objective by mandating a set, 
normal distribution for the overall post-calibration employee performance rating (Cappelli and 
Tavis [2018], Hastings [2011]).  
Considering that organizations want overall performance rating distributions with a non-
trivial proportion of the employees rated below the average of the rating scale, and supervisors 
want to maintain ratings that are relatively higher with few employees rated below the average of 
the rating scale, the calibration process, and specifically the mandate to meet the organization’s 
required distribution, puts pressure on the calibration committee to make downward adjustments. 
This, however, does not mean that every performance rating of each supervisor needs to be 
adjusted downwards. And, as a result, supervisors in peer-level calibration will have incentives 
to be strategic by suggesting downward adjustments to other supervisors’ employee performance 
ratings while obtaining the preferred higher ratings for their own employees. Accordingly, the 
calibration process will likely resemble a negotiation where there will be winners, those 
supervisors able to obtain higher than average post-calibration ratings for their own employees, 
and losers, those supervisors who leave the calibration process with lower than average ratings 
for their employees. In this study, we investigate the post-calibration ratings, the adjustments, 
and the pre-calibration ratings to examine whether strategic incentive-driven behavior by 
supervisors predicts the winners and losers of the peer-level calibration process.   
We hypothesize that supervisors with more political influence will be able to obtain higher 
post-calibration employee performance ratings. They will use their political influence to 
convince the rest of the calibration committee members that other supervisors’ employee 
performance ratings should be adjusted downwards while protecting their own employee 
performance ratings. We also predict that supervisors who will benefit more from higher ratings 
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will be able to obtain higher post-calibration ratings because they are willing to ‘fight harder’ 
(e.g., collect more supporting information, influence peers before the meeting, push harder 
during the calibration process) to obtain these ratings. Specifically, we hypothesize that 
supervisors with stronger reputational concerns want to signal strong leadership skills by 
presenting a well-functioning and, thus, highly rated department (cf. Longenecker, Sims, and 
Gioia [1987]), and will invest extra time and effort into the calibration process resulting in higher 
post-calibration employee performance ratings.  
Because calibration committees tend to have multiple members (Hastings [2011], Fox 
[2009]), relationships within the calibration committees likely play an important role in shaping 
outcomes. We draw from literature on group negotiations showing the importance of formal and 
informal alliances (Polzer, Mannix, and Neale [1998], Jehn and Bezrukova [2010], Brion and 
Anderson [2013]). We predict that supervisors will support peer supervisors with whom they 
have an informal alliance at the expense of supervisors with whom they do not through, for 
example, not questioning their higher ratings and providing only positive additional performance 
information on their employees. The presence or absence of peer support matters because of the 
pressure to reduce ratings to meet the organization’s required rating distribution. We predict that 
supervisors who lack peer support will have a harder time defending their post-calibration ratings 
during the calibration process, which makes downward adjustments to their ratings more likely. 
As a result, we hypothesize that supervisors who lack peer support will receive downward 
adjustments and will have lower post-calibration employee performance ratings.  
Finally, considering that confrontation costs are a determinant of relatively higher 
performance ratings (i.e., leniency bias) in organizations without calibration (Bol [2011]), we 
examine the influence of supervisors’ aversion to confrontation in the peer-level calibration 
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process. Supervisors who have a higher aversion to confrontation will benefit more from higher 
post-calibration ratings, as they will reduce the likelihood of confrontations with employees, 
which are costly to these supervisors. However, supervisors with a higher aversion to 
confrontations are less willing and able to stand up for their employee performance ratings and 
confront peer supervisors during the calibration process, again because this is costly to them. As 
a result, we hypothesize that supervisors with higher aversion to confrontation will enter the 
calibration process with higher ratings, but will also suffer more downward adjustment due to 
their unwillingness to confront peers during the calibration process. 
We examine our predictions by studying an organization that has used both peer-level 
calibration committees and a required performance rating distribution since 2011. We were 
provided access to their 2014 performance evaluation data which contains subjective 
performance evaluation data for 737 employees submitted by 114 supervisors. Notably, the data 
includes both pre- and post-calibration performance ratings, information on the twenty-eight 
peer-level calibration meetings, and demographic data for both the supervisors and employees. 
We supplement this archival data with survey data on almost all supervisors who participated in 
the calibration meetings (96.6 percent response rate). The setting and the data provide us with a 
unique opportunity to examine who are winners or losers of the peer-level calibration process.   
We first confirm that the calibration process improves the conformity of the performance 
rating distribution with the distribution required by the organization’s executives. We then test 
our hypotheses and find evidence consistent with all of them. Specifically, our results show that 
supervisors’ political influence and concern for reputation are positively associated with higher 
post-calibration employee ratings. We also show that lack of peer support and aversion to 
confrontation are associated with downward revisions during the calibration process. Taken 
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together, these results show that peer-level calibration allows supervisors the opportunity to be 
strategic in the calibration process and, as a result, the adjustments (or lack thereof) made during 
the calibration process are not solely driven by the organizational objective of increased rating 
consistency, but also by supervisors’ incentives.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature on performance evaluation and 
compensation contracting. First, it contributes to the nascent literature on calibration committees 
by highlighting the importance of the structural design and the composition of calibration 
committees. The peer-level structural design, as seen in our setting, has some benefits. For 
example, supervisors can easily provide additional performance information, provide additional 
details on how rating criteria have been applied, and answer questions during the meeting 
(Risher [2014], Sammer [2008]). However, our study shows that by giving supervisors the 
opportunity to influence the calibration of their own employee ratings, supervisors will act 
strategically to secure more favorable performance ratings for their own employees. As a result, 
supervisors might push for an adjustment or refrain from suggesting an adjustment, not because 
the adjustment or lack thereof improves the consistency of the ratings, but because it helps 
supervisors secure ratings that will lower their own personal costs or enhance their own personal 
benefits related to performance evaluation.  
These findings have important implications for performance evaluation system designers. 
Our study indicates that when adding calibration to the performance evaluation process, the 
organization needs to carefully consider the inherent incentive conflict between supervisors and 
organizations and the opportunities the structural design of the calibration committee creates for 
supervisors to prioritize their own incentives over the objectives of the firm. Specifically, peer-
level calibration committees provide supervisors with the opportunity to be strategic during the 
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calibration process and, as a result, organizational objectives related to calibration may become 
of second importance to the supervisors. Organizations need to weigh the advantages of peer-
level calibration against this negative effect.   
Our study also highlights the importance of the composition of peer-level calibration 
committees, which is important given organizations’ discretion over choosing calibration 
committee members. We show that this committee design choice is not trivial because 
calibration outcomes are influenced by within-calibration-committee relationships. Specifically, 
our results indicate that supervisor peers that share informal alliances support each other, even at 
the expense of other supervisors not included in the alliance. This finding shows the importance 
of carefully considering peer-level calibration committee composition, to avoid putting certain 
supervisors, and their employees, at a disadvantage.  
Second, our study makes a strong contribution to the literature on performance rating 
accuracy. The majority of papers in this area have focused on identifying inaccuracies and biases 
(Moers [2005], Bol and Smith [2011]) and its determinants (Bol [2011], Woods [2012]). Only 
more recently, has the literature focused on how organizations can potentially improve rating 
accuracy. For example, Grabner et al. [2018] suggest linking the accuracy of supervisors’ 
employee performance ratings to their promotion opportunities, and Bol, Kramer, and Maas 
[2016] suggest increasing performance information accuracy and performance rating 
transparency. These approaches might be difficult to implement, therefore, not surprisingly, 
organizations have been interested in practitioners’ claims concerning the “debiasing” effect of 
calibration committees (e.g., Caruso [2013], Albert [2017]). For example, Risher [2011, p. 275] 
states about calibration meetings that “The meetings raise the level of honesty, reduce bias and 
discrimination and provide greater consistency in ratings across an organization”. Our study, 
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however, shows that supervisor incentive-driven bias is still very much present in employee 
performance ratings even after the use of peer-level calibration committees, thereby casting 
doubt on practitioners’ claims that calibration significantly increases rating consistency.1  
Our results are relevant for performance evaluation system designers and users because, 
contrary to the “rosy view” of some professionals (e.g., Risher [2014], Caruso [2013]), our 
empirical findings suggest that it is important not to overestimate the accuracy of post-calibration 
committee performance ratings when using them for important decisions such as promotions and 
resource allocation.  
We develop our hypotheses in Section II, and describe our research setting and variables in 
Section III. Section IV presents the results of our analyses and Section V concludes. 
 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
Calibration of employee performance ratings is the process in which calibration committee 
members meet to discuss, compare, justify, and potentially adjust preliminary subjective 
employee performance ratings (Lawler et al. [2012], Hastings [2011]). The main objective of 
performance rating calibration is improved performance rating consistency through greater 
consistency in the application of rating criteria and through decreased rater inaccuracies (Caruso 
[2013]). Organizations prefer ratings that clearly distinguish among bottom, average, and top 
performers (Kampkötter and Sliwka [2015], Murphy [1992], Bretz Jr. et al. [1992]). They do not 
want different performance levels to receive the same performance ratings nor do they want 
similar performance levels to receive different performance ratings. This objective often results 
in the organization providing the calibration committees with a mandate to meet a 
                                                          
1 Unfortunately, we cannot empirically establish whether ratings are more or less consistent/accurate when 
organizations use calibration committees versus when they do not. For a more detailed discussion see Section V. 
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predetermined, normal distribution for the post-calibration employee performance rating 
(Cappelli and Tavis [2018], Hastings [2011]).  
Calibration of employee performance ratings has been a common practice for at least the last 
10 years (Lawler et al. [2012], Risher [2014], Albert [2017]). For example, the Global 
Performance Management Survey [2013] found that of the 1,000 organizations from 53 countries 
surveyed, more than half (56 percent) use calibration meetings. The 2016 WorldatWork survey 
showed not only that 69 percent of the surveyed organizations use a formal calibration process, 
but also that 40 (18) percent used calibration for over 5 (10) years (Ledford Jr., Benson, and 
Lawler [2016]).2 In a field study examining subjectivity, Lillis, Malina, and Mundy [2018] find 
that three of the four participating organizations use formal calibration committees.3 
Despite the widespread use of performance ratings calibration in practice, there is limited 
academic research on calibration. Further, the studies that do exist focus on calibration 
committees with different structural designs. For example, Demeré et al. [2018] examine 
calibration committees where higher-level managers (e.g., segment heads) calibrate the lower-
level supervisors’ employee performance ratings. They show that calibration leads to a less 
lenient but more compressed performance rating distribution. Higher-level calibration differs 
from peer-level calibration because supervisors are not calibrating their own employee ratings, 
and are therefore not allowed the opportunity to strategically influence the adjustments to their 
own employee ratings. Grabner et al. [2018] examine mixed-level committees where both peer 
                                                          
2 Note that only companies that use “ongoing feedback,” “rating-less reviews,” and “crowd-sourced feedback” are 
included in this study, which suggests that all of these companies are early adopters of new performance 
management systems. Hence the percentage of calibration users might be higher than in a randomly selected group 
of organizations. 
3 Other examples of the prevalence of calibration include: the 2010 Sibson Consulting’s worldwide survey on the 
state of performance management (29 percent of the surveyed organizations used calibration meetings), the 2011 
poll of the Society for Human Resource Management (54 percent of the surveyed organizations used calibration 
meetings), and the 2013 Towers Watson study of performance management practices in the United Kingdom (35 
percent of the surveyed organizations used calibration meetings). 
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supervisors and higher-level managers are part of the calibration committee. They show that the 
higher-level managers incorporate lower-level supervisors’ evaluation behavior in their 
performance assessments of the lower-level supervisors. This provides lower-level supervisors 
with incentives to impress the higher-level managers through their employee rating choices. As a 
result, the structural design of the mixed-level calibration committee creates supervisor 
incentives (i.e., impressing higher-level managers) that are not present in peer-level calibration 
committees.  
Another structural design feature that differs in our setting compared to these prior studies is 
the presence of a required employee performance rating distribution. The setting of Demeré et al. 
[2018] does not mention a required employee rating distribution and the setting of Grabner et al. 
[2018] has a suggested employee rating distribution that is only a “guideline” that “is not 
enforced.” (Page 22) This is important because the enforcement of a distribution puts more 
pressure on the calibration committee as a whole to make downward adjustments and 
consequently increases the need for individual supervisors to be strategic in order to secure 
higher ratings for their own employees. Thus, we complement prior work on calibration by 
examining the incentive conflict between the organization and the supervisors in peer-level 
calibration committees, something that has not been addressed in earlier work, arguably because 
of the less pronounced role of the incentive conflict in these studies’ settings.  
  
2.1 SUPERVISOR INCENTIVES IN PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 
Research in management accounting shows the importance of supervisor incentives in 
subjective performance evaluation (Grund and Przemeck [2012]). This research shows that 
subjective performance ratings are not purely based on employee performance but also 
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influenced by supervisors’ own incentives to reduce their personal costs and enhance their 
personal benefits (Bol [2011], Du, Tang, and Young [2012]). Supervisors are able to consider 
their own incentives in subjective performance evaluations because outsiders have no way of 
showing that an individual rating is not the supervisor’s ‘true’ rating.4,5  
Prior research shows that supervisors, in general, prefer to give relatively higher performance 
ratings (ratings higher than the ‘true’ rating), especially to poor performers, because providing 
employees with higher ratings will likely result in pleasant conversations and appreciation (Bol 
et al. [2016]). Lower ratings, on the other hand, will likely result in painful conversations, 
confrontations, and damaged personal relationships (Napier and Latham [1986]). Moreover, 
lenient performance ratings also tend to align with employees’ overestimated self-assessments, 
which increases fairness perceptions and employee motivation (Bol [2011]).6,7 These are general 
tendencies; supervisors also have incentives to provide some employees with lower ratings. For 
example, the supervisor might want to punish an employee for non-obedient behavior 
(Longenecker et al. [1987]), build a case for dismissal (Poon [2004]), or reinforce feedback when 
the employee is not responsive (Taylor, Tracy, Renard, Harrison, and Carroll [1995]). 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the collective empirical evidence shows supervisors’ 
preference to provide their employees with higher, more lenient performance ratings in 
subjective performance assessments (e.g., Moers [2005], Bol [2011]).  
                                                          
4 This also means that researchers cannot precisely measure the inaccuracies in individual performance ratings. 
Research can, however, provide theory-consistent empirical evidence on incentive-driven rating biases by showing 
statistical patterns consistent with rater incentives (see e.g. Bol [2011]). 
5 Another factor that influences subjective employee performance assessments is cognitive biases (e.g., Bol and 
Smith [2011], Lipe and Salterio [2000]). Cognitive biases are however not incentive driven and are therefore outside 
the scope of this study.  
6 Psychology research shows that individuals have a tendency to overestimate their abilities relative to their 
supervisors (McFarlane and Thornton [1986], Harris and Schaubroeck [1988]). 
7 Note that in order for ratings to increase motivation they need to be in line with the employee’s self-assessment, 
not significantly higher. When the ratings are higher than the self-assessed performance suggests, the system will no 
longer motivate employees to work hard as the link between pay and performance is missing (see Bol [2011]). 
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As a result, organizations using required performance rating distribution that limit the 
frequency of high ratings will experience misalignment between supervisors’ rating preferences 
and the organization’s required rating distribution. The organizational mandate to comply with 
the required rating distribution will therefore put pressure on the calibration committees to make 
predominantly downward adjustments. This, however, does not mean that each rating or some 
ratings of each supervisor need to be adjusted downward. As a result, supervisors in peer-level 
calibration will have incentives to strategically suggest downward adjustments to other 
supervisors’ employee performance ratings while securing the preferred higher ratings for their 
own employees. Accordingly the calibration process will resemble a negotiation where there will 
be ‘winners’, who are supervisors able to obtain higher than average post-calibration ratings for 
their own employees, and ‘losers’, supervisors who leave the calibration process with lower than 
average ratings for their employees. In this study, we investigate the post-calibration ratings, the 
adjustments, and the pre-calibration ratings of peer-level calibration committees to examine 
whether strategic incentive-driven behavior by supervisors predicts the winners and losers of the 
peer-level calibration process.  
  
2.2 POLITICAL INFLUENCE 
Consistent with the management literature on negotiation (e.g., Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale 
[2005], Zartman and Rubin [2002], Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld [2007]), we argue that 
supervisors with more political influence, for example those connected to top management 
through personal relationships and/or those with more skill for acquiring political capital, will be 
more successful in obtaining higher employee performance ratings in the calibration process. We 
argue that supervisors with more political influence, will be more successful in convincing others 
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of their points of view than other supervisors because going against these supervisors may have 
negative political repercussions. This is consistent with the budgeting literature where Fisher, 
Frederickson, and Peffer [2000] find that more powerful negotiators make fewer concessions 
than less powerful negotiators and therefore end up with more desirable budgets. Given 
supervisors’ preference for higher ratings, we hypothesize that supervisors with more political 
influence will be more successful in securing higher performance ratings for their own 
employees. Formally stated: 
H1: Supervisors’ political influence will positively affect the supervisors’ post-
calibration employee performance ratings. 
2.3 REPUTATIONAL CONCERNS 
Another reason for supervisors to prefer higher employee performance ratings is because of 
the signaling value of ratings (Rosaz and Villeval [2012]). That is, supervisors who want to 
signal strong leadership skills will want to present a well-functioning and highly rated 
department, independent of whether that is an accurate reflection of true performance. This is 
consistent with Longenecker et al. [1987] who interviewed 60 executives and found that when 
individuals outside the department reviewed the ratings, supervisors inflated their ratings to 
avoid "hanging dirty laundry out in public." (p. 188).  
Due to this signaling value, we predict that supervisors who are more actively trying to build 
or maintain their reputation will invest more time and effort into convincing their peer 
supervisors that their employees deserve higher ratings. That is, because they will benefit more 
from higher ratings, they are more willing to ‘fight hard’ to obtain higher ratings than other 
supervisors, for example by collecting more supporting information, influencing peers before the 
meeting, and negotiating more aggressively during the calibration process. Our prediction is 
consistent with the field interviews in Lillis et al. [2018], in which one of their interview 
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participants acknowledged that “fighting harder” could result in significantly better outcomes.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that supervisors who are more concerned about their reputation 
will be more willing to invest time and effort into securing higher ratings. Formally stated: 
H2: Supervisors’ reputational concerns will positively affect the supervisors’ post-
calibration employee performance ratings. 
2.4 LACK OF PEER SUPPORT 
Considering that calibration committees tend to have multiple supervisors (Hastings [2011], 
Fox [2009]), the role of relationships within the calibration committees needs to be considered. 
The literature on group negotiation processes shows the importance of formal and informal 
alliances between different group members (Polzer et al. [1998], Jehn and Bezrukova [2010], 
Brion and Anderson [2013]). Consistent with this literature we predict that supervisors will build 
informal alliances through friendships or close working relationships with other calibration 
committee members and that they will support each other at the expense of those supervisors 
who are outside the informal alliance. Because of the pressure to reduce employee performance 
ratings during the calibration process, supervisors without peer support (i.e., no informal 
alliance) will not have other supervisors endorse their ratings and advocate for their interest, 
which will likely result in downward rating adjustments. Therefore, we hypothesize that lack of 
support from peer supervisors will lead to performance rating adjustments and lower post-
calibration employee performance ratings. Those supervisors who lack peer support because they 
are not part of any informal alliance will be the ‘losers’ of the calibration process. Formally 
stated: 
H3a: Lack of peer support will positively affect the likelihood that supervisors will 
receive downward adjustments to their pre-calibration employee performance ratings 
during the calibration process.   
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H3b: Lack of peer support will negatively affect supervisors’ post-calibration employee 
performance ratings. 
2.5 AVERSION TO CONFRONTATIONS 
Individuals tend to avoid confrontation because it can trigger negative physical and 
emotional reactions (e.g., increased stress levels) (Czopp, Monteith, and Mark [2006], Friedman, 
Tidd, Currall, and Tsai [2000]) and destroy personal relationships (Murphy and Cleveland 
[1995], Longenecker et al. [1987]). Prior literature shows that supervisors who face higher 
confrontation costs provide more lenient and compressed employee performance ratings in a 
setting without calibration (Bol [2011]). We expect these tendencies to persist in a calibration 
setting. As a result, we predict that supervisors with higher aversion to confrontation will 
strategically try to avoid personal cost by entering the calibration process with higher ratings.  
However, we also expect that the aversion to confrontation will influence the supervisors 
during the calibration process. We predict that those supervisors with higher aversion to 
confrontation will be unable to sustain their higher ratings throughout the calibration process. In 
order to maintain higher employee performance ratings, supervisors need to convince peer 
supervisors not to make any downward adjustments to their performance ratings. It is unlikely 
that supervisors with higher aversion to confrontation will be successful in ‘standing up’ to their 
peer supervisors like that. Instead, they are more likely to quickly give in when peer supervisors 
suggest changing their ratings because they want to avoid confrontation. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that supervisors with stronger aversion to confrontation will enter the calibration 
process with higher ratings than other supervisors but that they are more likely to receive 
downward adjustments to their employee ratings. Formally stated: 
H4a: Supervisors’ aversion to confrontation will positively affect supervisors’ pre-
calibration employee performance ratings. 
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H4b: Supervisors’ aversion to confrontation will positively affect the likelihood that 
supervisors will receive downward adjustments to their pre-calibration employee 
performance ratings during the calibration process.   
 
3. Research Setting and Variables 
3.1 THE RESEARCH SITE 
We test our hypotheses using performance data from a large publicly-owned Brazilian 
company. For 2016, the company had total assets of over R$5.7 billion (about $1.71 billion US), 
net revenues of over R$5.3 billion (about $1.58 billion US), and is considered the Brazilian 
leader in its industry. The company employs over 16,000 employees located in geographically 
disperse industrial plants, distribution centers, and administrative offices throughout Brazil. To 
help standardize performance evaluation within a given hierarchical level across locations, the 
company implemented a new performance evaluation system in 2010. We focus our study on the 
managerial level as the evaluation system at this level includes peer-level calibration.8 
 
3.2 THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM 
The performance evaluation system involves a yearly evaluation of every employee by his or 
her supervisor using six or seven individual subjective performance measures (i.e., performance 
results, innovation, initiative, interpersonal skills, communication effectiveness, technical 
knowledge, and leadership) and one departmental performance measure.9 Employees receive a 
rating between one and four for each individual performance measure and the rating on the 
departmental performance measure is a function of both the department’s performance and the 
employee’s individual contribution to the department’s performance. Specifically, each 
                                                          
8 The managerial level includes directors, supervisors, and specialists. Our study focuses on the supervisors’ 
assessments of specialists (hereafter employees). 
9 The decision of which performance measures to use for a particular job function is made at the executive level. 
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employee within a department receives the same base rating between one and four, contingent on 
the department’s performance, which the supervisor can then adjust one point up or down 
depending on the employee’s contribution to the department’s performance. The scores of the 
individual performance measures are then averaged together and used in conjunction with the 
individualized departmental performance measure to determine whether an employee is rated as 
“below expectations”, “meets expectations”, or “exceeds expectations”. As shown in Figure 1, an 
employee’s overall rating is the union of their x-axis and y-axis positions, where the rating on the 
x-axis is determined by the individualized departmental performance measure and the location 
on the y-axis is determined by averaged individual performance measures. As participants 
perform better on both sets of performance measures, they move toward the top right corner of 
the matrix and their overall performance rating improves.10 Employees’ overall performance 
ratings influence merit pay, promotion, and job assignment decisions. Additionally, employees 
rated in the top right cell of Figure 1 are publicly recognized and receive a bonus of R$1,000 
(about $300 US) to be used for job-related purchases (e.g., new technology and continuing 
education courses). To prevent too many employees rated as “exceeds expectations” and not 
enough rated as “below expectations” and to increase consistency in the application of 
performance criteria, the firm implemented a required distribution and peer-level calibration 
meetings, respectively. 
The required performance rating distribution is determined by top management. Supervisors 
have discretion to evaluate their employees as they see fit; however, the overall required 
company-wide rating distribution is that 10 to 20 percent of the employees receive “exceeds 
                                                          
10 We find that supervisors attend to the matrix when determining performance ratings. We find that only 5 out of 
737 employees (0.7 percent) are given an initial overall rating that does not match what the matrix would suggest 
given the average of their individual performance rating and the individualized departmental performance rating. 
Results are unchanged when dropping these five observations. 
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expectations” ratings, 10 to 20 percent receive “below expectations” ratings and the remaining 
60 to 80 percent receive “meets expectations” ratings. The organization implemented this 
required distribution because the executives wanted the ratings to follow a normal distribution. In 
particular, the executives wanted to limit the number of employees rated as “exceeds 
expectations” to better identify true top performers for future promotion and pay increases. 
Moreover, the executives wanted to ensure that supervisors actually rated their poor performers 
as “below expectations” to trigger the development of a formal employee improvement plan and 
to alert the HR department so they could monitor the execution of the improvement plan. The 
executives of the organization feared that without this performance rating distribution, 
supervisors would provide too many high ratings and too few low ratings. 
Regarding the composition of the peer-level calibration committees, each peer-level 
calibration meeting consists of at least two supervisors and one or more HR representatives. The 
HR department, with input from the company executives, assigns each supervisor to a particular 
meeting. Their goal is to assign supervisors who frequently interact with each other to the same 
calibration meeting to minimize the level of information asymmetry among supervisors. This 
often results in supervisors who have a similar job function being assigned to the same 
calibration meeting. This also means that there is considerable consistency in the calibration 
committees’ composition over time. Although supervisors are occasionally assigned to a 
different calibration meeting to accommodate work and/or vacation schedules, these instances 
tend to be the exception rather than the norm.  
Each calibration meeting follows a similar set of guidelines. First, the HR representative 
displays the distribution of the performance ratings of all employees to be discussed during that 
calibration meeting. Then each supervisor justifies all of his or her employee ratings by 
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describing how he or she determined the ratings for the individual and individualized 
departmental performance measures.11 During this process, the supervisor might be asked to 
clarify what behavior of the employee led to the ratings, how that behavior is reflective of the 
specific performance measure, and how often that behavior occurred. After all supervisors in the 
calibration meeting agree on that employee’s evaluation, the ratings are adjusted, if needed. This 
process is repeated until all supervisors have justified all their employees’ ratings. 
 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
We approached the company in 2013 and requested access to their 2014 archival 
performance evaluation data, which the company provided to us in 2015. This data included both 
the pre- and post-calibration meeting employee classifications and the pre- and post-calibration 
meeting scores for the individual and individualized departmental performance measures for 
over 800 employees provided by 118 supervisors. The company also provided archival 
calibration meeting data including the list of supervisors that participated in each calibration 
meeting and the date and length of each calibration meeting. Finally, the company gave us access 
to demographic data such as gender, age, and tenure for the supervisors and employees.  
In addition to collecting archival data, we also surveyed supervisors immediately after their 
calibration meeting.12 We sent surveys to the 118 supervisors who participated in the calibration 
meetings and received 114 responses for a 96.6 percent response rate.13,14 In the survey, 
                                                          
11 Supervisors only provide verbal justification for their employee performance ratings. 
12 The survey was conducted in Portuguese. We first created the survey in English and one of the authors and two 
native Portuguese-speaking Ph.D. students translated the survey into Portuguese. We then pilot-tested the 
Portuguese version with an employee at the company and made changes based on the feedback. Finally, we shared 
the Portuguese version with the executives of the organization. They requested that we add, remove, and adjust 
some of the questions. After several rounds of discussion, we arrived at the final, distributed Portuguese version. 
13 We achieved such a high response rate because top management was interested in receiving feedback on the 
calibration committee meetings and was therefore willing to send several emails emphasizing the importance of 
filling out the survey. The HR department also provided us with the date of each calibration committee meeting so 
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supervisors answered questions about themselves and their perceptions of the other supervisors 
in their calibration meeting. To better understand the performance evaluation process and to 
inform our survey questions, we also conducted on-site interviews. In particular, one member of 
the research team visited the company twice to interview three executives who were responsible 
for the design of the performance evaluation system and two supervisors who had participated in 
calibration committee meetings. These interviews provided insight into the calibration meeting 
process and highlighted recurring themes that were incorporated into our survey. 
 
3.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
For our analysis, we focus on employees’ overall performance ratings. Our first dependent 
variable, PRE RATING, is coded 3, 2, or 1, respectively, based on whether an employee was 
rated as “exceeds”, “meets”, or “below expectations” prior to the calibration meeting. Our 
second dependent variable, CHANGE DOWN, is an indicator variable coded 1 (0) if an employee 
did (did not) receive a downward adjustment during the calibration meeting. Our third dependent 
variable, RATING CHANGE, is calculated as POST RATING – PRE RATING and measures the 
direction and magnitude of each employee’s rating change resulting from the calibration 
meeting. Our fourth dependent variable, POST RATING, is coded 3, 2, or 1, respectively, based 
on whether an employee was rated as “exceeds”, “meets”, or “below expectations” after the 
calibration meeting. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
we could send the survey immediately after the meeting. In addition to top managements’ emails, we sent a 
reminder once a week to those supervisors who had not completed the survey. 
14 For completeness we perform a non-response test on the four supervisors who did not respond. We find that three 
of the four non-respondents are female while the gender ratio of our respondents is 77 percent male and 23 percent 
female. We observe no differences in age, job tenure, or firm tenure. Given the low number of non-respondents, we 
do not feel the difference in the gender ratio between respondents and non-respondents impairs our ability to 
generalize the results of the survey to the population of interest. 
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3.5 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In this section, we discuss the independent variables we use to test our hypotheses. Section 
IV provides our results using these independent variables as well as alternative specifications of 
these independent variables. 
To test H1, which predicts a positive association between supervisor political influence and 
post-calibration ratings, we use a proxy for political influence that captures supervisors’ ability to 
network and their connectedness with top executives. To measure networking, we ask 
supervisors six networking questions from the political skill inventory scale (Ferris et al., 
[2005]), which measures each supervisor’s ability to influence a large number of people through 
the size and composition of their network.15 To measure connectedness with top executives, we 
ask supervisors to indicate which, if any, vice-presidents they had personally talked to within the 
past year when they wanted to affect the outcome of an important decision. Then, we create a 
supervisor-level indicator variable coded 1 if a supervisor selected any one of the three most 
influential vice-presidents from the list and 0 otherwise.16 We run a single principal component 
analysis (PCA) using these seven items. All networking and connectedness items load positively 
on a single factor (POLITICAL INFLUENCE) with an eigenvalue of 3.59 that explains 51 
percent of variance.17 
To test H2, which predicts a positive association between supervisors’ reputational concerns 
and post-calibration ratings, we asked supervisors to indicate their perceptions of their peer 
supervisors’ reputational concerns. Specifically, we asked each supervisor to answer the 
                                                          
15 The responses to all survey questions involved a 7 point Likert Scale with lower (higher) values indicating strong 
disagreement (agreement) with a given statement. 
16 There are 6 vice-presidents but from our interviews it became clear that not all of them wield the same level of 
influence. Our contact within the firm indicated that there was a natural divide between the first three and the second 
three and we therefore used the first three to create our proxy. 
17 All items have a loading score between 0.26 and 0.46. The first networking item, networking time, had the lowest 
loading score. After dropping this item, all other factor scores are between 0.36 and 0.46. Section IV reports results 
using this alternative proxy. 
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following question about each peer supervisor in the calibration committee: “How important it is 
to ______ that his/her subordinates are perceived as top performers by others in the company?” 
We then averaged the responses to get a reputational concern score for each supervisor 
(REPUTATION).18 
To test H3a (H3b), which predicts supervisors’ lack of peer support is positively (negatively) 
associated with the likelihood of downward adjustments (post-calibration meeting ratings), we 
use a proxy that captures lack of peer support. We reason that supervisors who work in the same 
functional area (e.g., accounting, finance, sales) are likely to build informal alliances with each 
other because of their close working relationship, which will result in support during the 
calibration process. Supervisors without these close colleagues in their calibration committee 
will therefore likely lack this support. As a result, we code as 1 those supervisors who are the 
only one from their functional area in their calibration meeting, contingent upon the calibration 
meeting having more than two supervisors, 0 otherwise. (LOW PEER SUPPORT). 
To test H4a (H4b), which predicts supervisors’ aversion to confrontation is positively 
associated with pre-calibration meeting ratings (the likelihood of their ratings being adjusted 
downward), we asked supervisors to indicate their perceptions of their peer supervisors’ 
confrontation avoidance. Specifically, we asked each supervisor in the calibration committee to 
answer three questions about their fellow supervisors’ confrontation avoidance behaviors. For 
each supervisor, we averaged the peer supervisors’ responses to each of the three questions. We 
use PCA to combine these three questions and get a single confrontation avoidance score for 
each supervisor. All three items load positively on a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.37 that 
                                                          
18 The final set of survey questions is the result of several rounds of back and forth between the researchers and the 
company. In the original survey, we asked multiple questions about reputational concerns; however, senior 
management would not allow us to include those questions in the survey. 
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explains 79 percent of variance (AVOID CONFRONTATION).19 Table 1 provides a list of all 
questions used to create our variables.  
 
3.6 CONTROL VARIABLES 
At the calibration meeting level, we control for the size of the calibration meeting by 
including a variable measuring the number of supervisors present in each meeting (CAL SIZE). 
At the employee level we control for job type (EMP JOB) and the region of Brazil in which the 
employee is located (EMP REGION).20  
4. Results 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables. The 
average post-calibration rating is significantly lower than the average pre-calibration rating (2.07 
vs. 2.13, p < 0.01, two-tailed, non-tabulated) and the mean rating change is negative, suggesting 
most adjustments were downward adjustments. We also note that in 2014, twenty-eight 
calibration meetings took place.21 The meetings had between two and nine supervisors, with an 
average of 4.44 supervisors. 
Table 3 provides the correlation of our variables. We observe that PRE RATING is negatively 
correlated with RATING CHANGE (corr. coef. = -0.36; p < 0.01). This suggests that employees 
with higher (lower) initial ratings are more likely to receive downward (upward) adjustments.  
                                                          
19 Although this hypothesis focuses on confrontation avoidance and not perceived confrontation avoidance we used 
perceptions of peers as we were afraid that supervisors might not truthfully answer these questions about 
themselves. 
20 The company identified six major job types, which are used to create the indicator variable EMP JOB. The 
company divides its operations into four different regions, which are used to create the indicator variable EMP 
REGION.  
21 For one calibration meeting only one supervisor provided survey data. We exclude this observation from our 
analysis because some of our independent variables involve the perception of other supervisors in the calibration 
meeting. As such, our final analyses include 27 calibration-meeting observations. 
 
 
24 
We note PRE RATING is positively correlated with POST RATING (corr. coef. = 0.84; p < 0.01), 
which suggests that employees with higher (lower) initial ratings are more likely to leave the 
calibration with higher (lower) ratings. We also note that REPUTATION and AVOID 
CONFRONTATION are positively correlated with PRE RATING (corr. coef. = 0.19 and 0.24; p = 
0.04 and 0.01, respectively) while REPUTATION (LOW PEER SUPPORT) is positively 
(negatively) correlated with POST RATING (corr. coef. = 0.19 and -0.19; p = 0.04 and 0.04, 
respectively). This pattern of correlations is consistent with H2, H3, and H4. 
 
4.2 RATING DISTRIBUTIONS 
To confirm that the employee performance ratings distribution after the calibration meets the 
required distribution we examine the distribution of the pre- and post-calibration performance 
ratings. Panel A of Table 4 indicates the majority of employees (68.9 percent) were rated “meets 
expectations” prior to the calibration meeting. Further, more employees were rated “exceeds 
expectations” and fewer employees were rated “below expectations” than the required 
distribution suggests (22.0 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively, compared to 10-20 percent). 
Panel B reveals that there were 80 ratings changes; that is, 10.9 percent of employees received a 
rating adjustment during calibration. Panel B also reveals that most of the rating changes (77.5 
percent) were downward. The majority of the downward rating changes (71 percent) reclassified 
employees from “exceeds” to “meets expectations”. The majority of upward revisions (61 
percent) reclassified employees from “meets” to “exceeds expectations”. As expected, the rating 
distribution post-calibration is better aligned with the distribution required by the organization. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that after calibration, 10.6 (72.2) [17.2] percent of employees are rated 
as “below” (“meets”) [“exceeds expectations”], consistent with the required distribution of 10-20 
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(60-80) [10-20] percent of employees rated as “below” (“meets”) [“exceeds expectations”]. 
Panel C provides detail of the ratings at the calibration level meeting. We observe that 20 (3) [5] 
of the calibration meetings had, on average, downward (upward) [no] rating changes.  
 
4.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We utilize multiple regression models to test our hypotheses. Our general model is: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐿 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸) + 𝛼2(𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) + 𝛼3(𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇)
+ 𝛼4(𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) + 𝛼5(𝐶𝐴𝐿 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛼6−10(𝐸𝑀𝑃 𝐽𝑂𝐵)
+ 𝛼11−13(𝐸𝑀𝑃 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁) + 𝜖   
where Rating is either PRE RATING, CHANGE DOWN, RATING CHANGE, or POST RATING. 
Rating, EMP JOB, and EMP REGION are at the employee level, CAL SIZE is at the calibration 
meeting level, and all other variables are at the supervisor level. We cluster standard errors by 
calibration meeting for all regressions. 
To examine pre-calibration ratings, we utilize an ordered probit with PRE RATING as the 
dependent variable because the variable is ordered with 1 being the lowest rating and 3 being the 
highest rating (Model 1). To examine rating adjustments, we run three regressions. The first and 
second are logit regressions with CHANGE DOWN as the dependent variable without and with a 
control for PRE RATING, given the significant negative correlation between RATING CHANGE 
and PRE RATING (Models 2 and 3, respectively). The third regression is an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression with RATING CHANGE as the dependent variable that also controls 
for PRE RATING (Model 4). Finally, we run an ordered probit with POST RATING as the 
dependent variable without and with a control for department performance (Models 5 and 6, 
respectively). Using multiple models allows us to examine the winners and losers of the 
calibration process (i.e., supervisors who left the calibration meetings with higher/lower average 
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employee performance ratings, respectively). Our approach also allows us to examine how final 
ratings were achieved (i.e., whether the winners (losers) entered the calibration process with 
higher (lower) employee performance ratings and/or received rating changes during calibration). 
 
4.4 HYPOTHESIS TESTING  
Table 5 presents results of our hypothesis tests. H1 predicts that supervisors’ political 
influence is positively associated with post-calibration employee performance ratings. Model 5 
reveals support for this hypothesis in the form of a positive association between POST RATING 
and POLITICAL INFLUENCE (coef. = 0.10; p < 0.01, one-tailed). Model 1 shows that these 
supervisors enter the calibration meetings with higher pre-calibration scores (coef. = 0.09; p = 
0.03, two-tailed) and Model 2 indicates that because of their political influence, these supervisors 
do not receive significant downward adjustments (coef. = 0.00; p = 0.97, two-tailed). In addition, 
we compare the regression coefficient of POLITICAL INFLUENCE across Model 1 (PRE 
RATING) and Model 5 (POST RATING) and find that the difference between the coefficients is 
not significant (Chi2 = 0.05; p = 0.82, two-tailed, non-tabulated). We find similar results using 
alternative specifications of POLITICAL INFLUENCE.22 Taken together, this suggests that 
supervisors with higher political influence are winners of the calibration process in that they 
leave the calibration process having secured higher employee performance ratings relative to 
their peers. 
 H2 predicts that supervisors’ reputational concerns are positively associated with post-
calibration employee performance ratings. Model 5 reveals support for this hypothesis in the 
                                                          
22 We rerun our analyses dropping the first networking item, networking time, due to its relatively low loading in the 
PCA. We also rerun our analyses using the networking questions as one variable and the connectedness question as 
another separate variable. Results are robust to these alternative specifications (all p ≤ 0.02, one-tailed). We also 
average the responses to the questions together instead of using PCA and find consistent results (p < 0.01, one-
tailed).  
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form of a positive association between POST RATING and REPUTATION (coef. = 0.19; p < 
0.01, one-tailed). Model 1 shows that these supervisors enter the calibration meetings with higher 
pre-calibration scores (coef. = 0.21; p < 0.01, one-tailed) and Model 2 indicates that because of 
their reputational concerns, these supervisors do not receive significant downward adjustments 
(coef. = -0.01; p = 0.98, two-tailed). In addition, we compare the regression coefficient of 
REPUTATION across Model 1 (PRE RATING) and Model 5 (POST RATING) and find that the 
difference between the coefficients is not significant (Chi2 = 0.26; p = 0.61, two-tailed, non-
tabulated). This suggests that supervisors with higher reputational concerns are winners of the 
calibration process in that they leave the calibration process having secured higher employee 
performance ratings relative to their peers. 
H3a predicts that supervisors’ lack of peer support will increase the likelihood of receiving 
downward adjustments. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis would be a positive association 
between LOW PEER SUPPORT and CHANGE DOWN in Model 2. We find evidence consistent 
with this as indicated by the significant positive coefficient for LOW PEER SUPPORT (coef. = 
0.85; p = 0.02, one-tailed). We also find consistent evidence in Models 3 and 4. In particular, 
LOW PEER SUPPORT is positively associated with CHANGE DOWN and negatively associated 
with RATING CHANGE controlling for PRE RATING (coef. = 1.31 and -0.06; p < 0.01 and = 
0.03, one-tailed, respectively), again suggesting that supervisors without peer supervisor support 
receive downward adjustments. We also hypothesize that lack of peer support affects post-
calibration ratings (H3b). The negative association between LOW PEER SUPPORT and POST 
RATINGS, which we find in Model 5 (coef = -0.24, p = 0.01, one-tailed), supports this 
hypothesis. We note that LOW PEER SUPPORT is not associated with PRE RATING in Model 
1, suggesting that these supervisors do not have significantly different employee performance 
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ratings (compared to their peers’ employee performance ratings) when entering the calibration 
meeting. A comparison of the coefficients on LOW PEER SUPPORT across Model 1 (PRE 
RATING) and Model 5 (POST RATING) confirms that the adjustments received were significant 
as the coefficient on POST RATING is lower than the coefficient on PRE RATING (Chi2 = 1.95; 
p = 0.08, one-tailed, non-tabulated). We find similar results using alternative specifications of  
LOW PEER SUPPORT.23 Taken together, this suggests that supervisors without peer support are 
losers of the calibration meetings.  
H4a predicts that supervisors’ aversion to confrontation is positively associated with the 
supervisors’ pre-calibration meeting ratings. The significant positive coefficient for AVOID 
CONFRONTATION (coef 0.09; p = 0.02, one-tailed) in Model 1 supports this hypothesis. H4b 
predicts supervisors with higher aversion to confrontation receive more downward adjustments 
than supervisors without a strong aversion to confrontation. To investigate, we examine the 
association between AVOID CONFRONTATION and CHANGE DOWN in Model 2. The 
significant positive coefficient for AVOID CONFRONTATION (coef. = 0.30; p = 0.02, one-
tailed) supports H4b. Models 3 and 4 yield additional support for H4b. In particular, AVOID 
CONFRONTATION is positively associated with CHANGE DOWN and negatively associated 
with RATING CHANGE controlling for PRE RATING (coef. = 0.17 and -0.02; p = 0.10 and = 
0.04, one-tailed, respectively). A comparison of the coefficients on AVOID CONFRONTATION 
across Model 1 (Pre Rating) and Model 5 (Post Rating) confirms the adjustments received were 
significant (Chi2 = 8.06; p < 0.01, one-tailed, non-tabulated). We find similar results using an 
                                                          
23 We test the robustness of H3 using two alternative specifications of LOW PEER SUPPORT. For the first 
alternative specification we code supervisors who are the only ones in the company working in a particular 
functional area as one. For the second alternative specification, we code those supervisors who are from a small 
functional area (fewer than 4 supervisors) as one. Both H3a and H3b are supported with these alternative 
specifications (all p < 0.02, one-tailed using either specification). 
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alternative specification of AVOID CONFRONTATION.24 Taken together, this suggests that 
supervisors with high levels of confrontation avoidance are losers of the calibration process.  
 
4.5 ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AND ROBUSTNESS 
4.5.1 Objective Departmental Ratings. One alternative explanation for our findings is that 
higher (lower) post-calibration employee performance ratings are not driven by supervisors’ 
incentive-driven rating behavior but by real differences in employee performance. For example, 
the higher ratings for supervisors with high political influence could arise if these influential 
supervisors have better-performing employees. To test this alternative explanation, we rerun our 
analysis with POST RATING and include the departmental objective performance measure as a 
control variable. This objective performance measure indicates the average employee 
performance level of the department and therefore is not influenced by supervisors’ incentive-
driven rating behavior. If differential employee performance explains our findings, then we 
expect our results to be weakened by the inclusion of this control variable. Model 6 in Table 5 
provides the results. We first note that the departmental objective performance measure is 
positively associated with employees’ overall ratings, as expected (coef. = 0.45; p < 0.01, two-
tailed). However, we still find that POLITICAL INFLUENCE and REPUTATION are both 
significantly positively associated with POST RATING (coef = 0.08 and 0.12; p < 0.01 and = 
0.02, one-tailed, respectively). Moreover, LOW PEER SUPPORT continues to be negatively 
associated with POST RATING (coef = -0.22; p = 0.01, one-tailed). These results suggest that the 
higher (lower) post-calibration ratings for employees of supervisors with higher political 
influence and reputational concerns (lack of peer support) are not solely driven by higher (lower) 
                                                          
24 We test the robustness of H4a and H4b using an alternative specification of AVOID CONFRONTATION. We 
average the responses of the three questions together instead of combining them using PCA. Results are robust to 
this alternative specification (both H4a and H4b are supported with p < 0.05, one-tailed). 
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performing employees and that supervisor incentives influence the calibration process and 
outcomes. 
 
4.5.2 Evidence of the Importance of Peer support. Hypothesis 3a and 3b show that lack of peer 
support leads to downward adjustments and lower post-calibration ratings. In this additional 
analysis section, we examine whether having peer support positively influences calibration 
outcomes. We argue that those supervisors who have at least one other supervisor from their 
functional area in their calibration meeting are able to build informal alliances that lead to 
willingness to support each other during the calibration process, which results in higher post-
calibration employee performance ratings. To examine this, we again focus on the composition 
of the calibration committees. Within each calibration meeting, we code supervisors that have at 
least one other supervisor in their functional area as one (zero otherwise). Panel A of Table 6 
reveals through two-tailed t-tests that supervisors with support from peers have directionally 
higher pre-calibration ratings (2.15 vs. 2.10; t = 1.32; p = 0.19, two-tailed) and, despite having 
higher pre-ratings, they receive fewer downward adjustments (0.06 vs. 0.11; t = 2.48 p = 0.01, 
two-tailed). Together this results in higher post-calibration ratings (2.10 vs. 2.02; t = 2.21; p = 
0.03, two-tailed).  
We also examine whether calibration committees with supervisors who all work in the same 
functional area differ from calibration committees with supervisors from a variety of functional 
areas. We code those calibration committees that are homogenous in nature (i.e., all supervisors 
in the committee work in the same functional area) and compare their pre- and post-calibration 
ratings to those who are not. Panel B of Table 6 reveals that homogenous calibration committees 
have higher pre-calibration ratings than non-homogenous calibration committees (2.19 vs. 2.09; t 
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= 2.60; p = 0.01, two-tailed). Despite these higher ratings, they receive fewer downward 
adjustments (0.05 vs. 0.10; t = 2.44; p = 0.02, two-tailed). Together this results in higher post-
calibration ratings (2.16 vs. 2.00; t = 4.10; p < 0.01, two-tailed). These analyses provide evidence 
that close working relationships that result in peer support provide supervisors with an advantage 
during the calibration process. 
 
4.5.3 Alternative Model Specification. We also test the robustness of our results using 
alternative regression specifications. In particular we use a multilevel mixed-effects model to 
acknowledge that our independent variables are at three different hierarchical levels. In 
particular, our multilevel structure consists of 737 employee observations (level 1) nested in 113 
supervisor observations (level 2) nested in 27 calibration meeting observations (level 3). The 
advantage of using this alternative regression specification is that it decreases the risk of Type 1 
errors because the standard errors are not underestimated (Raudenbush and Bryk [2002]). 
Specifically, we use the following model where i, j, and k are the subscripts for employee, 
supervisor, and calibration meeting, respectively and DV is either PRE RATING, CHANGE 
DOWN, RATING CHANGE, or POST RATING.  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 1: 𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 = 𝛼0,𝑗,𝑘 + 𝛼1,𝑗,𝑘(𝐸𝑀𝑃 𝐽𝑂𝐵) + α2,j,k(𝐸𝑀𝑃 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2: 𝛼0,𝑗,𝑘 = 𝛽0,0,𝑘 + 𝛽0,1,𝑘(𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐿 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸 ) + 𝛽0,2,𝑘(𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁)
+ 𝛽0,3,𝑘(𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇) + 𝛽0,4,𝑘(𝐴𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑇) + 𝑢0,𝑖,𝑗 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 3: 𝛽0,0,𝑘 = 𝛾0,0,0 + 𝛾0,0,1(𝐶𝐴𝐿 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝑣0,0,𝑘                                 
 
We provide the results of the alternative regression specification in Table 7 and note that our 
results are largely unchanged. This shows that our results are robust to using multilevel mixed-
effects models. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the role of supervisor incentives in peer-level calibration 
committees.  Peer-level calibration committees, where supervisors are involved in the calibration 
of their own employee performance ratings, provide supervisors opportunities to influence 
calibration outcomes in their own favor. We show that some supervisors are indeed able to 
secure more advantageous employee performance ratings. Specifically, our results suggest that 
supervisors with more political influence and supervisors with greater reputational concerns 
strategically enter the calibration process with higher ratings and are able to maintain these 
higher ratings. We also find evidence of incentive-driven downward adjustments during the 
calibration process. Our results indicate that supervisors who lack peer support and supervisors 
who are high on confrontation avoidance are more likely to receive downward adjustments.  
These findings have important implications for performance evaluation systems designers. 
Our study indicates that when adding calibration to the performance evaluation process, 
designers need to be cognizant of the inherent incentive conflict related to calibration between 
supervisors and the organization. When the organization uses peer-level calibration, supervisors 
will have incentives to be strategic during the calibration process to secure higher performance 
ratings. This will likely come at the expense of the organizational objective related to calibration: 
improving rating consistency. It is therefore important to carefully weigh the organizational costs 
and benefits of each calibration design structure. The designers of the performance evaluation 
system also need to carefully consider the composition of the calibration committees. Our results 
indicate that not considering group dynamics, specifically the extent to which supervisors are 
able to build informal alliances, can put certain supervisors, and thereby their employees, at a 
disadvantage.  
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As with any study, the limitations of our study provide opportunities for future research. 
Although our results clearly indicate the presence of incentive-driven supervisor behavior, which 
allows us to conclude that several consultants are overselling the extent to which calibration can 
eliminate rater bias (e.g. Caruso [2013], Albert [2017]), it is still an open question whether 
introducing calibration into the performance evaluation process increases rating accuracy 
compared to a performance evaluation process without calibration. Although calibration leads to 
the required performance rating distribution, which arguably limits how lenient ratings are on 
average, this does not mean that ratings are more accurate on an individual basis. Arguably, it is 
more problematic when some ratings are inflated and some are deflated, as documented in this 
study, compared to a situation where all ratings are lenient, a pattern that has been repeatedly 
documented in settings without calibration committees (e.g., Moers [2005], Bol [2011]). Future 
research can develop a sophisticated field experiment to examine whether calibration improves 
rating accuracy.  
Moreover, in this study we have focused on incentive-driven behavior, but subjective 
performance ratings are also subject to unconscious biases. Supervisors, like everyone else, use 
cognitive shortcuts based on stereotypes in decision making, which results in more 
advantageous/disadvantageous behavior towards certain groups of people (Banaji and Greenwald 
[2016], Uhlmann and Cohen [2005]). Calibration committees can potentially help combat 
unconscious biases by drawing attention to the possibility that one might unconsciously apply 
biases, and by creating a more deliberate decision making process (i.e., one less based on 
cognitive shortcuts). We leave it to future research to examine the effect of calibration on 
unconscious biases in subjective performance evaluation.  
Our study also highlights some interesting opportunities for future research. Our study 
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suggests that we cannot speak of the consequences of calibration; the effect that calibration has 
on the performance evaluation process is influenced by the structural design of the calibration 
committees. For example, Demeré et al. [2018], in a setting with higher-level calibration 
committees, find no evidence of strategic behavior, while we find abundant evidence of strategic 
behavior in our peer-level calibration setting. Therefore, the extent to which managers engage in 
incentive-consistent strategic behavior during calibration is likely a function of the type of 
calibration occurring. More research is warranted to gain a full understanding of how the 
structural design of the calibration process influences the calibration outcomes.   
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FIGURE 1 
Performance Evaluation Matrix 
 
  Individualized Departmental Performance 
Measure 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Average 
Individual 
Performance 
Measures 
3.5 – 4.0 N/A Meets Above Above 
2.5 – 3.4 N/A Meets Meets Meets 
1.5 – 2.4 Below Below Below Below 
0.0 – 1.4 Below Below Below Below 
 
Middle management employees are evaluated using six or seven individual-level performance measures and one 
individualized department-level performance measure. Each employee receives a score between one and four on 
each of the individual-level performance measures. The individual-level performance measures are averaged 
together and this average determines where an employee falls along the y-axis of the matrix. The individualized 
department-level performance measure is a function of both the employee’s department performance and the 
employee’s individual contribution to the department’s results. That is, each employee within a department will 
receive the same base score between one and four contingent on the department’s performance. The department 
supervisor can then adjust the score of each individual employee up or down one point, based on his or her 
contribution to the department’s performance. This determines where an employee falls along the x-axis of the 
matrix. The employee’s classification is the union of their x-axis and y-axis position. Employees are classified as 
“Below”, “Meets”, or “Exceeds” expectations. No employees were classified in the “N/A” cells. 
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TABLE 1 
List and Description of Proxies 
  
Proxy Description 
PRE RATING 
Coded 1, 2, 3 for employees who were rated “below”, “meets” 
“exceeds” expectations prior to the calibration process. 
CHANGE DOWN Coded 1 if employee received a downward revision, 0 otherwise. 
RATING CHANGE POST RATING – PRE RATING 
POST RATING 
Coded 1, 2, 3 for employees who were rated “below”, “meets” 
“exceeds” expectations after the calibration process. 
POLITICAL INFLUENCE a 
𝛼 = 0.76 
Variable created using PCA on the following items: 
 I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others. 
 I am good at building relationships with influential people at work. 
 I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work 
whom I can call on for support when I really need to get things done. 
 At work, I know a lot of important people and I am well connected. 
 I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others. 
 I am good at using my connections and network to make things happen 
at work. 
 Variable coded 1 if supervisor had personally talked to one of the three 
most influential executive directors over the past couple of years when 
they wanted to affect the outcome of an important decision, 0 otherwise. 
REPUTATION a,b 
Variable created for each supervisor by averaging responses to the 
following question from peer supervisors in their calibration 
committee: 
 How important is it to __________ that his/her subordinates are 
perceived as top performers by others in the company?  
LOW PEER SUPPORT 
Coded 1 for those supervisors who are the only one from their 
functional area in their calibration meeting, contingent upon the 
calibration meeting having more than two supervisors, 0 otherwise. 
AVOID 
CONFRONTATION a,b 
𝛼 = 0.87 
Variable created for each supervisor by averaging responses to the 
following questions from peer supervisors in their calibration 
committee. Variable created using PCA on the average responses 
 Do you think that __________ avoids confrontations with his/her 
subordinates? 
 Do you think that __________ finds it hard to criticize his/her 
subordinates, even if the negative feedback is totally justified? 
 Do you think that __________ avoids confrontations with other 
managers? 
For constructs measured using multiple questions, Cronbach’s Alpha (α) is provided. 
a All questions were measured using a 7-point Likert Scale with higher responses indicating higher levels of the 
variable with the exception of the last item of POLITICAL INFLUENCE, which is measured as described.  
b For the peer evaluation questions, each supervisor answered each question for all other supervisors in the 
calibration meeting. The name of a supervisor was inserted where the blank is. This process was repeated until the 
supervisor had answered all peer evaluation questions for all other supervisors in the calibration meeting.  
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
      
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
PRE RATING 2.13 2.00 0.54 1.00 3.00 
CHANGE DOWN 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 
RATING CHANGE -0.06 0.00 0.34 -2.00 1.00 
POST RATING 2.07 2.00 0.52 1.00 3.00 
 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
POLITICAL INFLUENCE 0.00 0.10 1.73 -6.15 3.18 
REPUTATION 5.63 5.75 0.98 2.00 7.00 
LOW PEER SUPPORT 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
AVOID CONFRONTATION 0.00 -0.08 1.56 -3.94 3.20 
 
Panel C: Control Variables  
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
CAL SIZE 4.44 4.00 1.82 2.00 9.00 
EMP JOB      
  1 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
  2 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 
  3 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
  4 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 
  5 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
  6 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
EMP REGION      
  1 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
  2 0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 
  3 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
  4 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 
Panels A through C provide summary statistics for our dependent and independent variables. Table 1 provides 
details on the dependent and independent variables. CAL SIZE is the number of supervisors present in each meeting. 
EMP JOB and EMP REGION are indicator variables for the type of job and region of Brazil in which the employee 
works. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 PRE 
RATING 
RATING 
CH. 
POST 
RATING 
POL. 
INF. 
REP. 
LOW 
PEER 
AVOID 
CONF. 
PRE RATING 1.00       
RATING CH. -0.36 1.00      
POST RATING 0.84 0.21 1.00     
POL. INF. 0.01 0.03 0.03 1.00    
REPUTATION 0.19 -0.01 0.19 0.03 1.00   
LOW PEER SUP. -0.17 -0.04 -0.19 0.05 0.03 1.00  
AVOID CONF. 0.24 -0.13 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.14 1.00 
 
Bold numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level or lower (two-tailed). Please see Table 1 for a list 
of all variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4 
Rating Distribution 
 
Panel A: Number (Percent) of Employees Classified as Below, Meets, or Exceeds Expectations 
 
 Below Meets Exceeds 
Required Distribution 10-20% 60-80% 10-20% 
    
Pre-Calibration Meeting 
67 
 (9.1%) 
508 
 (68.9%) 
162 
(22.0%) 
    
Post-Calibration Meeting 
78 
(10.6%) 
532 
(72.2%) 
127 
(17.2%) 
 
Panel B: Rating Change Detail 
 
 Downward Revisions No Change Upward Revisions 
 
From 
Exceeds to 
Below 
From 
Exceeds to 
Meets 
From Meets 
to Below 
No Change 
From Below 
to Meets 
From Meets 
to Exceeds 
Freq. (%) of 
Changes 
2 
(0.3%) 
44 
(6.0%) 
16 
(2.2%) 
657 
(89.1%) 
7 
(0.9%) 
11 
(1.5%) 
 
Panel C: Ratings Across Calibration Meetings 
 
CAL # SUP PRE CHANGE POST  CAL # SUP PRE CHANGE POST 
1 2 2.10 0.00 2.10  15 2 1.86 0.14 2.00 
2 2 1.45 0.00 1.45  16 4 2.28 -0.07 2.21 
3 4 2.26 -0.26 2.00  17 4 2.28 -0.08 2.20 
4 5 2.00 -0.05 1.95  18 3 1.96 -0.09 1.87 
5 5 1.75 -0.05 1.70  19 4 1.97 -0.09 1.88 
6 3 1.83 -0.25 1.58  20 5 2.13 0.06 2.19 
7 6 2.45 -0.14 2.31  21 4 2.27 -0.04 2.23 
8 6 2.09 -0.03 2.06  22 3 2.23 -0.08 2.15 
9 5 2.00 0.00 2.00  23 5 2.17 0.02 2.19 
10 2 2.08 0.00 2.08  24 4 1.97 -0.06 1.92 
11 8 2.49 -0.23 2.26  25 2 1.40 -0.10 1.30 
12 7 2.14 -0.09 2.05  26 3 2.23 -0.06 2.17 
13 9 2.19 0.00 2.19  27 5 2.06 -0.09 1.97 
14 6 2.22 -0.04 2.18  28 5 2.44 -0.13 2.31 
 
Panel A provides the number of employees that received “below”, “meets”, or “exceeds” expectations both pre- and 
post-calibration meeting. Panel B provides additional detail on changes resulting from the calibration meetings.  
Panel C provides calibration-level detail about the ratings. CAL is the calibration identifier. # SUP refers to the 
number of supervisors in each meeting. PRE (CHANGE) [POST] shows the average pre (change in) [post] 
calibration ratings. Calibration meeting number twenty-five is not included in our final sample because only one of 
the two supervisors responded to the survey.  
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TABLE 5 
Regression Models for Pre Rating, Rating Change, and Post Rating 
 
 Pre Rating Rating Change Post Rating 
Variable Ordered 
Probit 
(1) 
PRE 
RATING 
Logit 
 
(2) 
CHANGE 
DOWN 
Logit 
 
(3) 
CHANGE 
DOWN 
OLS 
 
(4) 
RATING 
CHANGE 
Ordered 
Probit 
(5) 
POST 
RATING 
Ordered 
Probit 
(6) 
POST 
RATING  
PRE RATING - - 
2.82*** 
(7.61) 
-0.25*** 
(-5.41) - - 
OBJ. 
PERFORMANCE 
- - - - - 
0.45*** 
(3.94) 
POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE 
0.09** 
(2.23) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(-0.53) 
0.01 
(1.26) 
0.10*** 
(3.47) 
0.08*** 
(3.46) 
REPUTATION 
0.21*** 
(3.25) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.18 
(-0.79) 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.19*** 
(2.92) 
0.12** 
(2.04) 
LOW PEER 
SUPPORT 
-0.10 
(-0.70) 
0.85** 
(2.00) 
1.31*** 
(3.89) 
-0.06** 
(-1.92) 
-0.24*** 
(-2.25) 
-0.22*** 
(-2.20) 
AVOID 
CONFRONTATION 
0.09** 
(2.12) 
0.30** 
(2.07) 
0.17* 
(1.27) 
-0.02** 
(-1.85) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
0.03 
(0.77) 
CAL SIZE 
0.10** 
(2.14) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(-0.66) 
0.01 
(1.39) 
0.11*** 
(3.59) 
0.11*** 
(5.17) 
       
Job Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 737 737 737 737 737 737 
Cal Clusters 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R2/Psuedo R2 0.13 0.08 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.13 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively. Coefficients and (z-scores) provided. 
Hypothesized directional relations are in bold and their p-values are one-tailed. All other p-values are two-tailed. 
 
This table provides the output from multiple regression analyses. Table 1 provides details on the dependent and 
independent variables. OBJECTIVE PER. is the objective departmental performance measure. Each employee 
within a department receives the same base score between one and four contingent on the department’s performance. 
The department supervisor can then adjust the score of each individual employee up or down one point, based on his 
or her contribution to the department’s performance. CAL SIZE is the number of supervisors present in each 
meeting. EMP JOB and EMP REGION are indicator variables for the type of job and region of Brazil in which the 
employee works.  
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TABLE 6 
Evidence of Informal Strategic Alliances through Peer Support 
 
Panel A: Comparison of ratings for supervisors with and without peer support 
 
 PRE RATING CHANGE DOWN POST RATING 
Supervisors without peer support 
(n = 307 employees; 50 supervisors) 
 
2.10 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
2.02 
(0.03) 
Supervisors with peer support 
(n = 430 employees; 63 supervisors) 
 
2.15 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
2.10 
(0.03) 
Difference 
 t = 1.32  
p = 0.19 
t = 2.48 
p = 0.01 
t = 2.21 
p = 0.03 
 
Panel B: Comparison of homogeneous and non-homogeneous calibration committees 
 
 PRE RATING CHANGE DOWN POST RATING 
Supervisors in homogeneous 
calibration committees 
(n = 297 employees; 39 supervisors) 
 
2.19 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
2.16 
(0.03) 
Supervisors not in homogeneous 
calibration committees 
(n = 440 employees; 74 supervisors) 
 
2.09 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
2.00 
(0.02) 
Difference 
 t = 2.60  
p = 0.01 
t = 2.44 
p = 0.02 
t = 4.10 
p < 0.01 
 
Average (Std. Error) are provided. A comparison of the two means is provided in the last row through two-tailed t-
tests. 
 
This table provides evidence of the importance of peer support. We argue that those supervisors who have at least 
one other supervisor from their functional area in their calibration meeting are able to build informal alliances that 
lead to willingness to support each other during the calibration process, which results in higher employee 
performance ratings. For Panel A, within each calibration meeting, we code supervisors that do have (do not have) at 
least one other supervisor in their functional area as Supervisors with (without) peer support. We then compare PRE 
RATING, CHANGE DOWN, and POST RATING across the two subsamples. For Panel B, we code each calibration 
committees based on whether it is homogenous or not. In particular, we code those calibration committees that only 
have supervisors from a single functional area as Homogenous calibration committees.  
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TABLE 7 
Mixed-Effect Regression Models for Pre Rating, Rating Change, and Post Rating 
 
 Pre Rating Rating Change Post Rating 
 Multilevel 
mixed-
effects 
ordered 
probit 
regression 
  
(1) 
PRE 
RATING 
Multilevel 
mixed-
effects 
logistic 
regression 
 
 
(2) 
CHANGE 
DOWN 
Multilevel 
mixed-
effects 
logistic 
regression 
 
 
(3) 
CHANGE 
DOWN 
Multilevel 
mixed-
effects linear 
regression 
 
 
 
(4) 
RATING 
CHANGE 
Multilevel 
mixed-effects 
ordered probit 
regression 
 
 
 
(5) 
POST 
RATING 
Multilevel 
mixed-effects 
ordered 
probit 
regression 
 
 
(6) 
POST 
RATING 
PRE RATING 
          -            - 
3.01*** 
(7.27) 
-0.24*** 
(-10.05) 
 
         - 
OBJ. 
PERFORMANCE 
     0.49*** 
(3.89) 
POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE 
0.09* 
(1.80) 
-0.03 
(0.21) 
-0.08 
(-0.69) 
0.01 
(1.10) 
0.10*** 
(2.80) 
0.08*** 
(2.24) 
REPUTATION 0.28*** 
(3.18) 
-0.08 
(-0.32) 
-0.35 
(-1.37) 
0.02 
(1.27) 
0.27*** 
(3.64) 
0.15*** 
(2.25) 
LOW PEER 
SUPPORT 
-0.21 
(-1.13) 
0.78** 
(1.63) 
1.36*** 
(2.87) 
-0.06** 
(-1.60) 
-0.25** 
(-1.71) 
-0.25** 
(-1.90) 
AVOID 
CONFRONTATION 
0.11** 
(2.02) 
0.36*** 
(2.24) 
0.21* 
(1.40) 
-0.02** 
(-1.80) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(1.04) 
CAL SIZE 0.10* 
(1.89) 
-0.11 
(-0.76) 
-0.18 
(-1.19) 
0.02* 
(1.65) 
0.12** 
(2.36) 
0.12*** 
(2.92) 
       
Job Indicator        Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Indicator        Yes         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations        737         737 737 737 737 737 
Wald 𝜒2 98.78 17.38 62.36 119.03 93.70 107.44 
Prob > 𝜒2 < 0.01 0.18 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively. Coefficients and (z-scores) provided. 
Hypothesized directional relations are in bold and their p-values are one-tailed. All other p-values are two-tailed. 
 
This table provides the output from multiple regression analyses. Please see Table 1 for details on the dependent and 
independent variables. CAL SIZE is the number of supervisors present in each meeting. EMP JOB and EMP 
REGION are indicator variables for the type of job and region of Brazil in which the employee works. 
